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This paper points out that in the well-known Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of banking, the full 
information social optimum cannot be implemented by deposit contracts once trading among agents is allowed. 
The paper is in stark contrast to Jacklin (1987), which shows that equity trading dominates the banking 
arrangement. By pointing out the flaw in Jacklin’s analysis, we show that neither the banking arrangement 
nor the equity trading can improve upon the autarky allocation.  The ability of the banking system to create 
liquidity is shown to depend on the possibility of trades among agents.  
I. Introduction
Since its publication the seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) (DD from now on) 
has become THE model of banking to use when one is interested in studying financial panic. 
The model has now become part of textbook expositions (see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) 
and Greenbaum and Thakor (2007)). A recent volume of Allen and Gale (2007), who use 
several variations of the DD model to study financial instability, best illustrates the importance 
of this model. 
Using a model where there are diverse preferences for liquidity or immediate consumption, 
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DD show that banks help to create liquidity and provide insurance for early consumers. Then 
they go on to show that while the banking arrangement has a good equilibrium, it also has a 
undesirable bank run equilibrium, where everyone rushes to the bank to withdraw their deposit 
early. Their analysis shows that it is the very function of liquidity creation by banks that gives 
rise to such a bank run equilibrium. DD thus provides the first economic justification for 
deposit insurance as a preventive measure against pure panic bank runs. 
The purpose of this short note is to point out a rather serious theoretical problem with the 
DD model, which, as far as we know, has not yet been clearly mentioned in the vast literature 
it spanned. It is that the banking equilibrium described by DD will not be sustainable if trade 
among agents is allowed. More seriously, there is a profitable deviation strategy each agent can 
follow that will upset the described banking equilibrium. This line of analysis is first carried 
out by Jacklin (1987), who shows that equity trading dominates the banking arrangement. 
However, we will show that Jacklin’s analysis depends on his assumption that companies are 
price-setters, not price takers. If we model companies and agents as price takers, then the 
difference between the equity market and the banking arrangement will disappear because both 
will result in the same allocation of resources. In short, both equity trading and the banking 
arrangement will result in autarky allocation. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, the original DD model and its results are reviewed 
in the first section. The second section describes the profitable deviation strategy available to 
agents in the economy, which will upset the banking equilibrium. The third section describes 
the equity trading mechanism and points out the flaw in Jacklin’s analysis. The final section 
concludes the paper.  
II. The Model
DD considers an economy with a single, perishable consumption good. The economy has 
three dates (T = 0,1,2). Production technology generates output of X > 1 at T = 2 for each unit 
of input at T = 0. If production is interrupted at T = 1, only one unit of consumption good is 
produced at T = 1, and nothing at T = 2. There is no production uncertainty.
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There is a continuum of agents of measure one. Each agent is endowed with one unit of the 
consumption good at T = 0 and nothing afterwards. Agents are indistinguishable as of T = 
0, but at T = 1, their type will be realized. A fraction t ∈ (0,1) of agents will be type 1, who 
can consume only at T = 1, and the remaining (1-t) fraction of agents will be type 2, who 
can consume both at T = 1 and at T = 2. For type 2 agents, time 1 consumption is perfect 
substitute for time 2 consumption. The preferences of each type of agents are given by:1
if type 1
if type 2
The type of each agent is his private information. Note that the realized distribution of types 
is fixed and known.
The autarky allocation is such that each agent invests all of his endowment in the production 
technology and consumes one unit at T = 1 if he turns out to be type 1. If he turns out to be 
type 2, he will continue the production and consume X units at T = 2. If  denotes the time T 
consumption of type i agent, the autarky allocation is  .
1. Full Information Social Optimum
As a benchmark, we compute the full information social optimum. Since it is obvious that at 
optimum, type i agents consume only at time T = i, we write ci for the consumption of the type 
i agent that occurs at time T = i(i = 1,2). A social planner with full information will maximize 
the expected utility tu(c1)+(1-t)u(c2) subject to the resource constraint
 (1)
The full information social optimum  is thus characterized by the first-order 
condition:
1   Here, we deviate from the original DD model which discounts type 2 agents’ preferences at a rate 0 < ρ < 1. This 
change has no impact on the results.
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 (2)
The full information social optimum is such that a total  of the investment will be 
liquidated at T = 1. DD further assumes that the relative risk aversion is greater than 1(–
cu" (c)/u' (c) > 1). Under this assumption, DD shows that the full information social optimum 
is incentive compatible.2 We summarize their main result as follows:
Proposition 1 (Diamond and Dybvig): If the relative risk aversion is greater than one, the full 
information social optimum is incentive compatible, and satisfies
The incentive compatibility condition is satisfied because type 1 agents cannot consume at 
time 2, and type 2 agents are getting . The key result here is ; unlike the autarky 
allocation, a type 1 agent can consume more than one unit at T = 1 under the full information 
social optimum. DD interprets this result as saying that the social optimum provides against 
liquidity needs of agents. 
2. Implementation via Deposit Contracts
Next, DD establishes that the full information social optimum can be implemented as a 
banking equilibrium with deposit contracts. To see how this works, suppose that a bank is set 
up and offers a demand deposit contract  characterized by equations (1) and (2). At T = 1, 
each depositor is required to announce his type. If a depositor announces he is type 1, he will 
2   Consider the function . Because the relative risk aversion being greater than 1 implies 
that the function cu' (c) is strictly decreasing, we have f (1) = u' (1) - Xu' (X)<0. Because f (z) is strictly decreas-
ing and , we have .
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get  at T = 1, and nothing at T = 2. If he announces he is type 2, he will get nothing at 
T = 1, and  at T = 2. Under the specified allocation, a type i agent can announce his 
type simply by showing up at the bank at T = i (i = 1,2). 
It turns out that there are two equilibria for this deposit game. In a good equilibrium, each 
agent truthfully announces his type. Since the allocation  is incentive compatible, no agent 
has incentive to misrepresent his type as long as all other agents do not lie. In this equilibrium, 
a type 1 agent consumes more than one unit thanks to the liquidity created by the bank.
The game has another undesirable run equilibrium if the deposit contract comes with the 
usual sequential service constraint of “first-come, first-served”. Since , if the total withdrawal 
exceeds  at T = 1, the bank will have to liquidate too much at T = 1 to be able to honor 
its promise to deliver  at T = 2. Therefore, if a depositor believes that a large number of 
depositors will try to withdraw their deposits at T = 1, he will run to the bank as well. If such 
a belief is widespread, the bank will fail at T = 1. As noted, the inequality  captures the 
liquidity creation function of the bank. But it is the very liquidity creation function of the 
bank that gives rise to this bank run equilibrium. While DD shows that a pure panic run is an 
equilibrium phenomenon, it does not say when and under what conditions such a panic run 
will occur.3 
In this paper, we are not concerned about the bank run equilibrium and the related issue of 
deposit insurance. Instead, we are going to show that the banking arrangement will not be able to 
implement the full information optimum  as an equilibrium if trading among agents is allowed. 
To see this, suppose that there is a bank offering deposit contracts of  . Consider the 
following arrangement. A large (continuum) number of agents form another coalition and offer 
a contract  to their members; type 1 agents get  and type 2 agents get X. Since , 
this coalition contract, if feasible, strictly dominates the bank deposit contract. The alternative 
coalition can offer  by doing the following. First, it will deposit fraction t of its collective 
endowment with the bank, and invest the remaining (1-t) fraction of its endowment directly 
in the production technology. At time T = 1, the coalition withdraws all of its deposits from 
3   This is because the bank run equilibrium is just one equilibrium in a model with multiple equilibria. One can use 
the concept of Global games (Morris and Shin (2003)) to show explicitly when the bank run equilibrium occurs.  
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the bank and gives  to each type 1 member of the coalition. The remaining type 2 members 
will get X at T = 2 from the direct investment in the technology. If the coalition is big enough, 
then the law of large numbers ensure that exactly t fraction of its members turn out to be type 
1, so that this arrangement is feasible. Since  strictly dominates the banking allocation 
, the banking equilibrium cannot be sustained.4 One may consider coalitions of this type 
as another bank. In this interpretation, for the banking equilibrium to be viable, no interbank 
deposits should be allowed. Otherwise, the banking equilibrium collapses.5
A more serious problem is that an individual agent is better off deviating from the banking 
equilibrium. Suppose that instead of depositing his endowment with the bank, an agent invests 
directly in the production technology at T = 0. At T = 1, if he turns out to be type 2, he 
will wait and consume X at T = 2. If he turns out to be type 1, he can find a type 2 depositor 
and persuade him into buying his investment for . Since the type 2 depositor can get  
by buying up the deviating agent’s investment, he will be willing to withdraw his deposit and 
pay him up to . Since there is a continuum of type 2 agents, the deviating agent is virtually 
guaranteed to get  as his allocation. Therefore, a deviating agent is better off than agents 
depositing their endowments with the bank. Note here that we do not require the deposit 
contract to be tradable. We only require that the type 2 agent who is holding a bank account 
to be allowed to withdraw his deposit at T = 1.
One may argue that if enough number of agents invest directly in the production 
technology, competition among these deviating agents implies that deviating agents will not 
be able to get  at T = 1 when they turn out to be type 1, thus lowering the return from 
deviation.6 However, the point is that as type 2 depositors try to withdraw their deposits at 
T = 1, the bank will not be able to honor its contract, and the banking equilibrium collapses. 
Summarizing our discussion so far, we have: 
4   Suppose that the coalition is of measure α∈(0,1). Then, the bank gets deposits of αt+(1-α) and has to pay out 
. This is not possible because of the resource constraint (1).
5   Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) study the interbank deposit market using DD model. They did not consider the 
possibility of interbank deposits unraveling banking equilibrium.
6   Given the deposit contract , deviation will occur as long as  
where b is the time 1 price of the time 2 consumption good. 
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Proposition 2: The full information social optimum cannot be implemented by the deposit 
contract; investing directly in the technology and trading at T = 1 is more profitable than depositing 
endowments in the bank.
The problem with the banking equilibrium is that after deposits are made with the 
bank, agents have incentives to trade. This is due to the fact that the full information 
optimal allocation is calculated based on the assumption of no trade among agents. Ex-post 
trading occurs because while the ex-ante market price implicit in the optimal allocation is 
, the ex-post market price is not equal to 1/X. If the ex-post market price 
of time 2 consumption is not equal to 1/X, agents are better off deviating from the banking 
equilibrium. In this regard, the problem is similar to the moral hazard problem where the 
optimal contract gives the agent incentives to go outside and trade (see Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1990)). 
The bank may design the deposit contract by explicitly considering the possibility of the 
trade among agents. Under this scenario, the bank will solve the following maximization 
problem:
     
Here, b is the price of the time 2 consumption good in terms of the time 1 consumption, 
and α∈[0,1], the fraction of the project liquidated at time 1. The first constraint is the bank’s 
budget constraint given the bank’s liquidation policy α and the market price b. This constraint 
assumes that the bank itself can and will participate in the market trades. 
The second constraint is the incentive compatibility condition that prevents trades we 
considered above. If , all type 2 agents will withdraw their deposits at T = 1. They will 
then get c1 and trade it for the time T = 2 consumption good, getting  ; they are better 
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off pretending to be type 1 than revealing their type truthfully and withdrawing c2 at time 2.7 
One may think that  and thus  should hold as well to prevent similar trades by 
type 1 agents. If , then type 1 agents would rather consume bc2 than stick with c1. He can 
do that only by pretending to be type 2 and trading his deposit with a type 2 agent. However, 
that requires the deposit contracts be tradable, so that the buyer (a type 2 agent) should have 
a way to register the deposit contract under his name. The bank can easily block such a trade 
by refusing to change the name of the account holder.8 In contrast, the trade which ensures the 
constraint  requires only that type 2 agents be able to withdraw their deposits at T = 
1, which should be allowed. Thus, when deposit contracts are not tradable, the only relevant 
incentive compatibility constraint is . 
We first consider the maximization problem without the second incentive compatibility 
constraint to see whether that constraint is binding. Without the second constraint, the first 
order condition becomes
 (3)
where . There are three possibilities depending on whether b is greater, or smaller 
than 1. When b = 1, c1 = c2 = 1, and the second constraint is satisfied. When b > 1, then the 
first order condition together with the assumption of the relative risk aversion greater than one 
implies
 (4)
7   When all type 2 agents withdraw their deposits at T = 1, then they have no one to trade with and thus will fail to 
get c1/b. However, one should not conclude from this that type 2 agents will not withdraw their deposits. When 
the market price is given by b such that c1>bc2 , withdrawing at T = 1 is the optimal action by type 2 agents in the 
competitive market. Whether such a trade occurs or not is a matter of equilibrium condition. 
8   If the selling type 1 agent withdraws his deposit and gives the amount to the type 2 agent, the amount will be 
only c1, not c2. So, withdrawing the deposit would not work. In this regard, recall that Jacklin showed that if trad-
able, bank deposit contracts are equivalent to equity trading.  
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Therefore, we have , and the second constraint  is not binding. In this case, 
the optimal solution is thus fully characterized by the above first order condition alone. Since 
,  implies c1<1. On the other hand, if b < 1, the opposite inequality 
 holds, so that  holds, and the second constraint becomes binding. 
Therefore, when b < 1, the solution is simply (c1, c2) = (1,1/b). 
From this, we can conclude that no matter what the market price b may be,  holds. In 
other words, if trading among agents is allowed, the bank demand deposit contract cannot 
promise to pay more than one unit of time 1 consumption good to type 1 agents. Since the 
liquidity creation function of banks is identified with the condition , we can say that 
banks cannot create liquidity when trading among agents is allowed. 
Proposition 3: Once trading among agents is allowed, and if the bank participates in the market 
trade,  holds irrespective of the market price . In other words, once trading occurs, banks cannot 
create liquidity. 
What if the bank is not allowed to trade in the market? In this case, the bank is faced with 
the resource constraint and the incentive compatibility condition. Therefore, the bank will 
solve
      
Without the incentive compatibility constraint, the optimum is characterized by
 (5)
Since X > 1, we know c1 < c2. Therefore, if b > 1, we have c1 < bc2. The incentive constraint 
is not binding. Now, consider the function h(b) = u'(bc2)-Xu'(c2) where c2 satisfies above 
first order condition. Then h(b) is strictly decreasing and satisfies h(1) < 0 and h(1/X) > 0. 
Therefore, there exists a unique 1/X < b̂  < 1 such that u'(b̂c2) = Xu'(c2) = u'(c1). If b > b̂ , then 
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the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding and the optimal solution is characterized 
by the condition u'(c1)-Xu(c2)=0. If b < b̂ , the incentive compatibility condition is binding and 
the optimal allocation is . The bank in this case can create liquidity 
if 1/X < b. Summarizing this, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4: The bank can create more liquidity only if it does not participate in the market and 
the market price satisfies > 1/X.  
In the following section, we will see that the equilibrium market price will be bX=1. 
Therefore, the bank cannot create liquidity whether or not the bank participates in the market. 
The resulting equilibrium allocation will then be identical to the autarky allocation (c1, c2)= 
(1, X).
III. Equilibrium with Equity Trading
We have seen that when agents of positive measure directly invest in the production 
technology, the bank will not be viable. Thus, let’s suppose that shares of many identical 
corporations with the same technology are traded in the equity market both at T = 0 and T = 1. 
Suppose further that at T = 0, shareholders of each corporation set their dividend policy of (d, f ), 
where d ∈[0,1] is payable at T = 1, and f = (1-d )X is the liquidating dividends payable at T = 2. 
The interim dividend d is necessary to enable agents of different types to trade at T = 1. At 
T = 1, type 1 agents would like to sell their equity holdings and type 2 agents are willing to 
buy them with their share of the T = 1 dividends d. This is the setting Jacklin used to compare 
the banking equilibrium and the equity market equilibrium. 
Let b again denote the price of the time 2 consumption good in terms of the time 1 
con-sumption good. Then, given the dividend policy d, each type 1 agent will be able to 
consume d + b(1-d)X at T = 1 while each type 2 agent will consume d/b + (1-d)X at 
T = 2. Therefore, at T = 0 shareholders of each corporation will set the dividend policy d by 
maximizing the following function H(d) subject to the constraint d ∈[0,1].
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 (6)
The market equilibrium occurs when that the total amount type 1 agents get is equal to the 
total amount type 2 agents have. Or,
tb(1-d )X = (1-t)d
By differentiating the function H(d), we get:
Note that the term in the bracket [·] is strictly positive. If bX > 1, then H'(d) < 0 so that d 
= 0 is optimal. However, if d = 0, type 2 agents have no way to pay for the shares of the type 1 
agent, and type 1 agents have nothing to consume (c1 = 0). Since the market clearing condition 
shows that the only price consistent with d = 0 is b = 0, this violates the precondition bX > 1. 
Therefore bX > 1 cannot be an equilibrium. On the other hand, if bX < 1, then d = 1 is 
the optimum. Yet, if d = 1, then the market clearing condition tb(1-d)X = (1-t)d cannot 
be satisfied; in this case type 2 agents can consume nothing, implying b = ∞. Thus bX < 1 
cannot be an equilibrium, either. Therefore, the only possibility is bX = 1. In this case, the 
market clearing condition implies d = t, which, in turn, implies (c1, c2) = (1, X), or the autarky 
allocation. In other words, the equity market equilibrium can implement only the autarky 
allocation. Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5: The equity share trading will result in the autarky allocation (c1, c2) = (1, X) and 
the unique equilibrium price is bX = 1.
This result is in stark contrast with Jacklin’s that equity trading can implement the banking 
allocation without any possibility of run. To see the difference, we reproduce Jacklin’s analysis 
here. From the market clearing condition, he first derives the equilibrium market price as a 
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function of the dividend policy d. Thus,
By plugging this into the expression H(d ), we get the objective function:
Shareholders choose the time 1 dividend d that maximizes U(d). If we denote d/t by c, the 
maximization problem becomes:
This is exactly the same as the full information social optimum problem. Therefore, in 
Jacklin’s analysis, the equity market equilibrium is exactly the same as that of the banking 
market, yet it does not suffer from the run equilibrium. This leads Jacklin to conclude that the 
equity market dominates the banking market.9
The difference between our analysis and Jacklin’s is that corporations in his analysis are not 
price takers, but price setters. In other words, in his analysis, the optimal dividend policy (d, f ) 
is chosen after taking into account the impact of dividend policy (d, f ) on the market price b. 
Thus corporations recognize the impact of their dividend policy on the market price b and 
choose the best market price for shareholders. In contrast, corporations in our analysis take the 
market price as given. Therefore, the dominance of the equity market over the banking market 
is due to this assumption of the price setter. 
One may argue that it is only natural for each corporation to realize that its share price 
depends on the its dividend policy and to set the dividend policy accordingly. However, even if 
corporations are price setters, Jacklin’s equity market equilibrium cannot be sustained because 
9   This also seems to be the reason why Diamond (1997) says that equity trading dominates the banking arrange-
ment.  
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an individual agent can profitably deviate. Once the equity contract offers the full information 
social optimum , any single agent can do better by investing his endowment directly in 
the production technology than buying the equity shares. The reason is the same as before. If 
he turns out to be type 2, he will consume X at T = 2. If he turns out to be type 1, then he 
will be able to sell his holdings at the market price b and get.
since  implies (1-d) < (1-t). Therefore, this deviant agent is doing better than others 
who buy equity shares:
In other words, a price-taking agent will always find it to be profitable to deviate. If everyone 
deviates, the equity trading game will result in the autarky allocation. Thus we now can state:
Proposition 6: Whether or not each corporation is a price taker, trading in equity shares will result 
in the autarky allocation with a market price of bX = 1. 
Note that since the equilibrium price is b = 1/X < 1, the banking equilibrium with ex-
post trading among agents yields the same autarky allocation of (c1, c2) = (1, X). Thus, the 
difference between banking equilibrium and equity trading equilibrium completely disappears 
even though deposit contracts are not allowed to be traded. At the same time, since they yield 
the same allocation, the equity market neither dominates, nor is dominated by, the banking 
arrangement.
IV. Conclusion
The general picture emerging from this exercise is that trading among agents is harmful 
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to the ability of the banking system to create liquidity. More specifically, we have shown 
that neither the banking arrangement nor the equity trading can improve upon the autarky 
allocation. In order to restore the positive role played by banks, one is thus led to consider 
reasonable restrictions on trading among agents. 
In his attempt to explain the sequential service constraint, Wallace (1988) uses the island 
model of Lucas and utilizes the absence of centralized capital markets. While this is a nice 
fable, it has limits because it severely constrains the trading possibilities. On the other hand, 
Diamond (1997) assumes that some type 2 agents who cannot trade in the market, possibly 
for high transaction cost and shows that both banks and the equity market con coexist. 
While Diamond’s paper is the first to combine banking and trading successfully, more work is 
obviously needed. 
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